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
ALLIES, WAR TERMINATION, AND WAR AIMS


by

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With the exception of the quoted material, the contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.



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Abstract of

ALLIES, WAR TERMINATION, AND WAR AIMS

Modern-day war termination between two states is rarely easy. It becomes exceedingly complex if the war has been fought with coalitions or allies. Each state enters the war with certain political (war) aims, which are never the same in either desire or intensity. These aims are the coalition partner's reasons for going to war and they may change during the conflict. Each state sees the war termination process differently, because of these war aims. This termination process is further complicated by how each partner has been affected by the war. Lastly, each state has its own vision of how the landscape should appear at the war's conclusion. During the post-conflict, political process, the various competing war aims must be resolved.

Today's coalition leader realizes that winning the military campaign is a requirement to achieving the states' war aims. But following the conflict, he will probably be delegated the responsibility for the initial phases of the post-conflict process. Therefore, to be truly successful, he must well understand and be able to integrate competing war aims, the termination process, and the post-conflict, political process.

Clausewitz's dictum, "No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to achieve it," is sound, indeed.¹ The results at the end of the conflict are what really matters. Yet, war termination is not easy and is often problematic. As any war draws to a conclusion, the victor must determine how far to go militarily, how much additional investment the war is worth, and what the future relationships will be between the two powers. The loser must determine if continued fighting will improve or weaken his position, not only during negotiations, but also for the long term. If termination procedures are completed hastily, without sufficient forethought, future conflicts are guaranteed. The military commander's job demands a solid understanding of the process of conflict termination. "By and large, it is the theater commander's job to translate the desired political end state into a military strategy; and part of this strategy must include an understanding of when and how to leave the conflict."²

Termination considerations are even more difficult if the conflict has been fought with allies or coalitions. Understanding these cooperative arrangements and their impact on the war termination process are of vital importance to the commander. Throughout recent history, coalitions or alliances have fought most of the major conflicts. As was demonstrated during the Gulf War, the United States will attempt to form a coalition or use an alliance prior to any future major conflict. The nation still remembers General Schwarzkopf as he concluded peace negotiations in a desert tent with his allies and the enemy. Therefore, to be successful, alliance leaders must well understand the principal elements involved in war termination with allies. The military leader must know the political (war) aims of each member of the coalition, the rational war termination process as it relates to each member's

war aims, and the effect war aims have on the post-conflict, political settlement. To this end, history provides abundant examples of specific areas to consider when concluding external coalition wars.

Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations provides very broad guidance on war termination. “Properly conceived conflict termination criteria are key to ensuring that victories achieved with military force endure.”³ The military leader must estimate how much effort (time, space, and forces) is required to bring about the desired settlement, or “the set of conditions necessary to resolve a crisis and transition from predominant use of the military instrument of national power to other instruments.”⁴ While still engaged in conflict, the military leader must have a clear idea of how the political leaders envision the landscape at the war’s conclusion. He must continually “assess operational design in terms of both cumulative and sequential operations and select those that will best achieve the political aims of that particular conflict.”⁵ Thus, he must see past the military desired end state and then work backwards, during the conflict, in order to create the conditions that lay the foundations for a good peace.

The same publication devotes an entire chapter to coalitions and alliances under the heading of “Multinational Operations”. The commander is instructed to “strive to understand each nation’s goals and how these goals can affect conflict termination and the desired end state....Multinational objectives should be attainable, clearly defined...and supported by each member nation.”⁶ However, the remainder of the chapter is then devoted on how to fight with a coalition or an alliance and no guidance is provided on how to use these goals or how to terminate a conflict with allies. Additionally, the commander of a coalition should not

necessarily be forced into following the publication's instruction, "U.S. forces must be dominant in the final stages of an armed conflict...."⁷

Clausewitz, as usual, understood well the difficulties involved with alliances and provided his own guidance:

To discover how much of our resources must be mobilized for war, we must first examine our own political aim and that of the enemy. We must gauge the strength and situation of the opposing state. We must gauge the character and abilities of its government and people and do the same in regard to our own. Finally, we must evaluate the political sympathies of other states {allies and coalitions} and the effect the war may have on them.⁸

Although he intended that these concerns be addressed prior to conflict, his advice is also good guidance for continual reassessment during the conflict and for war termination. The war (political) aims, the war termination (gauging) process, and the post-conflict settlement (political sympathy) process must all be integrated by the coalition leader.

WAR AIMS

When Clausewitz described war aims, he stated, "War can be of two kinds, in the sense that either the objective is to overthrow the enemy—to render him politically helpless or militarily impotent...or merely to occupy some of his frontier-districts...."⁹ Sun Tzu stated, "in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this. To capture the enemy's army is better than to destroy it...."¹⁰ These two principles were listed first and second under the title of offensive strategy. For both of these masters, the goals of the war were to either defeat the enemy's army or to take state territory. More recently, conflicts such as the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Cold War defied such traditional descriptions. From the perspective of the United States, all three had strong ideological components, not necessarily aimed at taking territory or rendering the enemy politically or

militarily helpless. In reality, the territories and the enemy were second in importance to maintaining a balance of power or to supporting an ideology. Thus, with apologies to both revered teachers, a more specific framework is necessary to guide the coalition leader in understanding his own war aims and those of his coalition partners.

To bridge this gap, Randle, in The Origins of Peace, enumerates six reasons for war, which the commander can use to understand his alliance partners: dominance, status quo, consolidation of the state, ideology, retribution, and opportunity.¹¹ If the war aim is *dominance*, the state's objective is to exercise control over another state politically, militarily, economically, or territorially. This aim is what has been traditionally associated with war. The victorious state may wish to impose its political form of government on the defeated state. The victor may likewise wish to establish military bases, or have basing rights within the country, or have access to resources, or receive war reparations. Economically-motivated wars can be placed in this category.

If the war aim is *status quo*, the state's objective is to maintain equilibrium within the current world order. A country, falling behind economically, or unhappy with its relative trend, may embark on this type of war to maintain its status quo. Any country attacked by another has, by definition, a war aim of at least status quo. During the last half of this century, the superpowers pursued a pattern of status quo, with the more brutal conflicts fought at the margins, for differing war aims.

If the war aim is the *consolidation of the state*, such as the Wars of German Unification, emphasis is on territorial integrity. Although not specifically addressed by the author, the consolidation may be based on race, ethnicity, or political aspirations. When

consolidation-of-the-state is the war aim of a coalition partner, geographical boundary concerns, territory, are vitally important to the war termination process.

If the war aim is *ideological*, the state's objective is to spread its belief system. Ideological wars are extremely difficult to terminate with any degree of satisfaction. Religious wars, such as the Crusades, with its Christianity versus Islam tenets, have not been completely resolved, even to this date. Communism threatened the world for half a century. The Bosnian conflict continues today, mostly along ideological divisions and consolidation-of-the-state aims.

If the war aim is *retribution*, the state's objective is punishment. Continued violations of a country's borders, treaties, or people may precipitate a war for retribution. The British impressment of Americans, and the subsequent War of 1812, and the war against the Barbary pirates were such cases. Although the state's objective would be punishment, at war termination, that state would also insist that appropriate measures be erected to prohibit the acts which caused the retribution. Randle also considers wars to be retributive in which a country provokes conflict. But, the underlying purpose for the provocation may still be found in the other aims.

If the war aim is for *opportunity*, the "state seeks to secure very specific, limited values...in the expectation of achieving its aims without significant losses."¹² These opportunistic wars are similar to the frontier-district wars which Clausewitz described. In the present-day, minor parties could be tempted to join a coalition or an alliance in a war of opportunity for prestige, for territory, or for a chance to gather some other form of the distributions.

It now becomes obvious that the war aims of each member of the coalition may overlap, may be combined, or may be entirely different. In reality, there are no identical interests. Even if both states fight for the same war aim, for example domination, how much territory does each desire? How does each side view its own intensity in pursuit of the war aims? World communism was the aim of both the Soviets and the Chinese, but the ideological war aims of these two allies almost brought them to conflict on a number of occasions. Yet by having a clearer understanding of the war aims of each partner, more detailed than the two proposed by either Clausewitz or Sun Tzu, the coalition leader can better merge common interests during the conflict and better understand the problems encountered prior to and during war termination. Constant reassessment of these war aims is also necessary during the progress of the conflict. "War aims...tend to change during war, and to be very much functions of what gains are possible and what cost is required. This is especially true of prolonged wars, those lasting more than a year."¹³

States, however, can form or join alliances or coalitions for a number of reasons, not necessarily considered under these war aims. They may coalesce for legitimacy in world opinion, for deterrence, for capability enhancement, for survival, for economic growth, or for a variety of other reasons. On the simplest level, coalitions may form because of a desire for status quo. Capability enhancements may be required for a war of dominance or retribution. Still, the underlying reasons for these partnerships relate directly back to war aims. A coalition partner's desire for membership will be contained within one or more of the war aims, should war ensue. And it is these war aims that the coalition commander must well understand.

WAR TERMINATION WITH ALLIES

Understanding and constantly reevaluating these aims are a mandatory requirement for improving the compromise processes necessary for coalition cohesion. But as the leader looks toward termination, he must also comprehend what each member has to gain or lose by continuing the conflict in relation to these war aims. At once, the military leader must realize that the addition of allies decreases the incentive for war termination.

Handel, in his essay on War, Strategy and Intelligence, provides a framework of eight conditions which either favor or hinder the war termination process; these are also applicable to coalition-fought wars:

1. External support is being received or will soon arrive.
2. Circumstances are in our favor or show signs of improving politically, militarily, or economically.
3. Time is on our side or the enemy's situation is deteriorating more rapidly than ours.
4. Gains can be maximized and/or a continuation of the fighting will help cut losses; military situation is improving (or will) and our war potential has not been fully actualized.
5. {The} domestic situation {is} stable; morale {is} high and public continues to support {the} war effort.
6. A "time out" will work to our enemy's benefit.
7. Terms the enemy offers are tough, excessively demanding and unacceptable.
8. Initiating negotiations will weaken our bargaining position.¹⁴

The coalition leader must understand these conditions and their significant effect on unity within the coalition. The most immediately applicable to alliances is the case where "external support is being received or will soon arrive." Alliances and coalitions, by definition, yield that external support. Warring states can be grouped into four separate categories: those exhibiting a rapid rise in power, a slow rise in power, a slow decline in power, or a rapid decline in power.¹⁵ The addition of allies, in all cases, contributes either a

rapid rise in power or a slow rise in power. Thus, no matter which of the four categories the enemy is exhibiting, the mere incorporation of allies greatly reduces the incentives for terminating war. For example, if the coalition brings in allies that yields a rapid rise in power, there will be no desire for the original party to terminate or negotiate with the enemy. The two European alliance structures, prior to World War I, were such a case. The original members had additional resources to fight and fight longer. In short, a state, which has not achieved its war aims and needs an ally to do so, has a much reduced incentive to terminate after the ally has joined the conflict. Whenever allies are added, the struggle will continue until either the enemy agrees to the coalition's demands or the coalition is losing or defeated. If the enemy is declining in relative power, the same logic holds true and the victory will be even greater. If the enemy and the coalition are both rising in power, the situation rivals the initiation of hostilities and the conflict will still be fought. The relative balance of power, and the outcome of the war, is still indeterminable. Only one possible combination exists which may give a coalition an incentive to terminate a war short of war aims or defeat. If the coalition, with the addition of allies, only experiences a slow rise in power, while the enemy experiences a rapid rise in power, the tendency exists for a negotiated settlement.

The addition of alliance members, and the relative power that accompanies them, is but one of the factors that Handel lists as working for or against a rational decision for termination. Seven other reasons complicate war termination and coalition cohesion. "Circumstances are in our favor or show signs of improving politically, militarily, or economically." On the surface, this situation is usually positive. Still, the coalition leader now must work backwards, through the war aims, to ensure the coalition remains intact. In a

coalition which has dominance the war aim of the two allied partners, (dominance/dominance), a positive position for war continuation exists. Such was the situation with Germany and Austria/Hungary in 1917. As the conditions continued to improve, there was more territory to dominate and split among the partners. They had little rationale to terminate the war at that point. Yet, the final outcome of World War I illustrates why the coalition leader must be aware of these rational considerations. On the other hand, if the war aims of the partners are different, for example status quo/dominance, the status quo partner may wish to terminate early and return to the pre-bellum landscape as the conditions improve.

“Time is on our side or the enemy’s situation is deteriorating more rapidly than ours.” In this case, the coalition leader must make sure that all the allies share the same belief that time is better for each one of them. He must also understand the deterioration of each ally. If one ally is suffering a greater loss, the leader must be alert for defections or a reduced desire to continue the conflict. Such was the case for the Allies in 1942. To keep the Soviet Union in the alliance, the three major partners agreed to an unconditional surrender policy. In a possible opportunity/dominance coalition, the opportunity partner has little incentive to remain in the coalition, if he is suffering and deteriorating rapidly, even though the enemy’s situation is overall getting worse relative to the coalitions’.

“Gains can be maximized and/or a continuation of the fighting will help cut losses; military situation is improving (or will) and our war potential has not been fully actualized.” In this case, if viewed similarly by all the coalition partners, the tendency is for the members to remain and contribute. The leader’s task is to ensure all the partners understand and

believe the circumstances. The prelude and start of Desert Storm was a classic example of this scenario.

“{The} domestic situation {is} stable; morale {is} high and public continues to support {the} war effort.” Each country has its own internal support or dissent factions. These dissenting factions and a shift of public opinion can quickly change the support a country and its armies give to the coalition and the war effort. The shift in public support during Vietnam was a major reason for the U.S.’s withdrawal from the region. The present-day coalition leader can exercise little direct influence on the politics within different countries. But he must remain sensitive to these issues, because he can contribute tangentially. The most important method of sustaining domestic support is through achieving military victories and by maintaining the appearance of successes. If that is not possible, the commander must avoid the appearance of constant defeats and attrition. Nothing will adversely affect public opinion and the coalition quicker than defeats, especially for status quo or opportunistic partners. If the conflict is being fought within the country of an ally, the coalition leader can ensure that public support is maintained through good relations between his forces and the local population. A high level of cooperation through a valid, viable government will engender domestic legitimacy and support for the coalition.

“A ‘time-out’ will work to our enemy’s benefit.” In this scenario, a reduction, or lull in the fighting, will actually improve the enemy’s capabilities in relation to the coalition’s. The commander must be persuasive enough that all the members resolve to continue the conflict. If any of the war aims of a partner have been met, or are close to being met, that party may be tempted to pursue the rest period, with an eye to possibly leaving the conflict.

Following both the Korean and Vietnam wars, western military and political leaders finally realized that the enemy can use these operational and strategic pauses to regroup and then continue the conflict afresh.

“Terms the enemy offers are tough, excessively demanding and unacceptable.” The coalition has the impetus to continue the fight, together, as long as every member sees the terms in approximately the same relative harshness. Under this scenario, the worst problem is when the enemy offers unacceptable terms to some members and relatively easy, or perhaps beneficial, terms to other partners. The coalition can be divided. Napoleon was an expert at exploiting such weaknesses in coalitions. The modern-day leader must work hard to manage these type of defections. For example, if the war aim of the party threatening to defect was opportunity, the leader could promise additional opportunities. Negatively, he may be forced to resort to threats, in order to keep the coalition intact.

“Initiating negotiations will weaken our bargaining position.” For any coalition, this alternative has two major subsets. In the first case, the mere attempt to make a peace may encourage the enemy to believe that the coalition is tired, weak, and ready for a cease-fire. The enemy may believe, contrary to the coalition’s desires, that now is the time to fight with renewed vigor. In short, broaching negotiations, without the enemy realizing that he is approaching defeat or desiring peace, may paradoxically elicit the opposite response than desired. Secondly, initiating the peace process will significantly affect the relationships within the coalitions based on the war aims. The leader must again return to evaluate the war aims of each member and ensure the start of negotiations will not be the cause of immediate defections. If dominance has not been achieved, will the dominant war aim country continue

the conflict alone? If one of the countries has achieved its consolidation aims, and the negotiations break down, will that country continue the fight again?

In summary, each partner's war aims will have a magnified effect on the coalition as the war termination process draws closer. The coalition leader must be acutely aware of these rational approaches and must work hard to develop those elements that contribute to unity and cohesion, while reducing those that tend to fragment and split the partners. "Consequently, terminating a conflict potentially presents more complex problems than either the formal surrender or the military destruction of the adversary."¹⁶

POLITICAL, POST-CONFLICT SETTLEMENTS

So far we have examined the various aims of the coalition members and the various incentives and impediments to war termination. The last process that the commander must understand is how war aims are related to and affect the negotiated settlement. At the end of a conflict, a quick and sharp turnover rarely occurs between the military and the political or civilian control. The coalition's military leader must be prepared to lead the peace process. "The military's organizational ability in applying resources rapidly in a crisis means that they will have the de facto lead in most post-conflict activities until a smooth transition can be made to civilian control."¹⁷

War endings are grouped into two basic categories: those wars ended by basically one side and those wars ended by negotiation. One-sided ending occurs when the victorious coalition has achieved its war aims and no significant participation is desired, or really necessary, on the part of the enemy. Included in this category are wars terminated by:

- Unilateral declaration
- General capitulation or unconditional surrender
- Withdrawal

Piecemeal conquest
Dissolution of a government
Extermination or expulsion¹⁸

With this type of conflict termination, the victorious coalition members concern themselves substantially with only resolving their respective war aims. For those of us willing to dismiss these types of settlements as unlikely for a United States-led coalition, one need only remember Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia. The victorious coalitions in those conflicts went about adjusting the landscape as they saw fit, with little input from the withdrawing partner.

However, most conflicts in which the United States would participate hopefully would be terminated in one of the following ways:

Peace treaty
Armistice, cease-fire, truce
Joint declarations
Political agreement
Oral agreements¹⁹

In each of the above, both sides are participants in the process. Still, the coalition commander must understand how each of the coalition members views the actions, whether one-sided or participatory. As was the case in war aims, the partners may view the endings differently, making the actual termination process more difficult. In the Iraq War, for example, some coalition members may have defined the war as one-sided, once Iraqi forces left Kuwait. Thus, there would have been no need for those coalition partners to continue. Other members could consider the conflict ended only when General Schwarzkopf signed the armistice.

However a war ends, the commander must look forward to the actual peace as the next step:

Post-conflict activities are the integrated political, economic socio-psychological and military activities that support conflict termination and national security objectives...Military post conflict activities may include security measures, intelligence, civil affairs, humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, force redeployment and other activities.²⁰

While much has been written regarding the elements of war settlement, in the final analysis, the peace involves answering questions about territory, people, and the avoidance of future conflicts. The war aims of the various coalition members will now have to be resolved, but the leader must always keep focused on the future. As the negotiations in the desert tent proved, the commander may not enjoy the luxury of turning over the problems to the State Department. The political leaders may, in fact, delegate the authority to conclude the peace to the coalition's military leader.

Post-hostility territorial decisions are usually quite involved. The obvious problem to be solved is how to divide the captured territory. This step is not limited to strictly geographical concerns, which, on their own, are quite problematic. The decisions must cover occupation forces, military bases or rights, access to ports, access to mineral or other economic wealth, and virtually anything of value to the coalition members which is subject to negotiation. In short, the victors must resolve the war demands derived from the war aims.

Therefore, war aims and territorial settlements among the coalition members become infinitely complex. The conquered territory and its wealth are finite. Yet the partners have aims which, at a minimum, are competitive and at the extreme, are far above the capacity of the territory to satisfy them. If the coalition partners had war aims of dominance/dominance, the division of the territory may, in fact, start a new conflict. With a war aim of dominance and any other aim, the other partners may worry that the dominant partner may pose a threat

to them in the future. The opportunistic partner, in all cases, expects some form of recompense.

Secondly, the coalition leader must concern himself with the status of the people in the conquered territory. He must lay out plans for the treatment of belligerents, non-belligerents, and war criminals, in order to lay the proper foundation for the landscape envisioned by the political leaders. The victors must also examine or resolve repatriation issues and population issues. Food, shelter, clothing, civil law and the responsibilities of each member for them must be addressed.

Likewise, the coalition partners' views of the treatment of the people in the affected territory may be completely different. Culture and history must be taken into account; they will remain long after most of the victors have departed. Depending on location, the people may have little use or acceptance of western ideas of equality. The partners must wisely negotiate consolidation-of-the-state aims or they may bring renewed conflicts. A coalition partner with a retribution war aim may have to be restrained to prevent war crimes.

Finally, to avoid future conflicts, the military leader must be able to view the conflict in two directions. One direction must be focused on the past and what has happened. What were the original war aims of the members and how can they be modified and resolved? What punishment, if any, must be exacted? And the other direction must be focused on the future. He must have an idea of how to prevent future conflicts, not only with the enemy, but also among the victors. "The essence of prudence in victory is the ability of the winner in warfare to skim off the cream of victory—to make maximum use of the military advantage—while causing the smallest possible increase in enmity on the part of the defeated."²¹ The

leader must concern himself with the type of government that will exist in the defeated country. Here, more than ever before, the commander must envision the world of tomorrow and decide what is best for his own state, divorced of coalition desires. And because each state is doing the same, the peace settlement is bound to produce both winners and losers.

Once again, the coalition leader must integrate war aims. A status quo partner could desire a return to normalcy, but that condition might not lead to long term stability in the region. An ideological war aim partner probably has no desire to having the same form of government continue to function. A dominance partner may want to continue relations with the same government, if access is guaranteed to the territory or economic resources.

For all three questions, the leader must concern himself with the time element, not only for the formalities, but also for the execution of the agreements. And he must install the proper mechanisms for carrying out the settlement. Phillimore, prior to the end of World War II, examined three centuries of conflict and peace. The result was nine maxims which he believed should be the foundation of any treaty. They are still applicable to any war termination scenario:

1. The boundaries between states must be natural...according to geography....strong for defence and yet not tempting to aggression.
2. If possible, no state composed of people desirous of living as one nation should be divided.
3. We cannot afford to forget the doctrine of the Balance of Power....
4. The provisions of the treaty should be immediately operative, not imposing upon states future obligations....
5. Treaties which impose burdens (servitudes) upon states, or which impair or qualify territorial sovereignty, tend to produce irritation and war....
6. Objections may also be made to treaties establishing a protectorate....
7. Yet there are cases in which the only way to take security against wanton aggression is to impose some special burden or constraint upon a state....
8. None of the treaties imposing special obligations can be, or ought to be, expected to be perpetual.

9. There are some treaties...which impose such constraint upon the ceding state that no reasonable politician can expect to endure at all, or to be otherwise than a worthless 'scrap of paper' unless the precaution is taken of securing material guarantees.²²

These guidelines are by no means commandments, but they must be understood and appreciated as the leader considers the war aims of the various partners, while conducting the actual termination process.

CONCLUSION

The coalition leader cannot afford to forget that winning militarily is only of secondary importance to achieving the states' war aims. And the war aims of each member are different. Because of this, he is of necessity the coalition's political leader as well as the military leader. To guarantee the most cohesive effort, he must have a solid understanding of each partner's war aims, how each partner views the termination process, and how each partner views the post-conflict, political settlement. With this knowledge, he can better guide his coalition during the final stages of the war.

War termination for two party conflicts is rarely easy. War termination with coalitions is infinitely more complex. Yet there are some basic guidelines that the coalition commander can use to improve the process. To be effective, the leader should:

*Understand perfectly his own country's war aims. He cannot coordinate the partners' war aims effectively if he does not have a solid idea of his own. Frequent discussions with his own political leaders are a requirement as the war progresses and war aims change.

*Understand the various war aims of the coalition members and how they relate. Are there war aims that are mutually exclusive or opposed and how can they be managed? The leader

must set the stage for the termination process early by encouraging cooperation and discussions, focusing on termination problems.

*Understand that the coalition partners will rationally pursue a war termination process that will be the most beneficial for their own country. Significant problems, which could lead to dissolution, may have to be resolved at a higher level by the political leaders. Still, the coalition leader, through his prior discussions with the partners, can provide additional insights to his own political leader.

*Resolve major differences among the coalition partners before the actual negotiation process begins. When the enemy is willing to negotiate, time is critical. "Spelling out the terms of settlement as soon as possible after the traumas of victory and defeat may seem brutal, but it is in fact a lesser evil than procrastination."²³

*Understand the war termination political bargaining process. The United States has traditionally viewed peace negotiations as an aftermath and distinct phase of the conflict. The pressure is on the military leader to get the forces home as quickly as possible. Intelligent adversaries realize that the political process is really what the war was about, not just the armed conflict. They will try to achieve during bargaining what they could not achieve during the war. Here the coalition leader must be proactive. Frequently, he sets the initial foundations for the peace terms. As Kissinger stated, "The way negotiations are carried out is almost as important as what is negotiated....how one enters negotiations, what is settled first...is inseparable from the substance of issues."²⁴

In summary, by having a clear idea of "what he intends to achieve", the military coalition leader is in a much better position to attain the best military and the best political

“desired end state”. Each coalition partner will view the termination process differently. It is the leader’s task to understand and then synthesize these war aims to get through the rational termination process and through the initial stages of the political, post-conflict settlement in the best position possible. For only after the peace process is resolved, can one really judge whether the coalition’s conflict was a success or failure.

NOTES

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 579.
2. Colonel C. Stanley Romes, Chief of Strategy Applications Branch (J5), Joint Staff, Washington, DC, quoted in Major Susan Strednansky, "Balancing the Trinity: The Fine Art of Conflict Termination," Air University Press, February 1966, 14.
3. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: 1995), 1 February, I-9.
4. Ibid., p. III-2.
5. Lieutenant Colonel Michael R. Rampy, "The Endgame: Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Activities," Military Review, October 1992, 53.
6. Joint Pub 3-0, VI-2.
7. Ibid., I-9.
8. Clausewitz, 585-586.
9. Ibid., 69.
10. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. by Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77.
11. Robert F. Randle, The Origins of Peace (New York: The Free Press, 1973), 54-60.
12. Ibid., 60.
13. Gay Hammerman, Conventional Attrition and Battle Termination Criteria (Washington, DC: Defense Nuclear Agency, 1982), 7.
14. Michael I. Handel, War Strategy and Intelligence (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1989), 479. All eight conditions subsequently listed within quotations came from Table 2 and were adapted for this paper.
15. Ibid., 476-477.
16. Rampy, 45.
17. Ibid., 54.

18. Berenice A. Carroll, "How Wars End: An Analysis of Some Current Hypotheses," Journal of Peace Research, 4th ed., 1969, 299.
19. Ibid.
20. Rampy, 53.
21. Nissan Oren, Prudence in Victory: The Dynamics of Post-War Settlements (New York: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1977), 1.
22. Sir Walter George Frank Phillimore, Three Centuries of Treaties of Peace and Their Teaching (London: John Murray, 1917), 3-6.
23. Oren, 3.
24. Henry Kissinger, "The Vietnam Negotiations," Foreign Affairs, January 1969, 218.

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